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Abstract
Background: The ninth outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo occurred in
Équateur Province from 8 May-24 July 2018. A system of health facility (HF)-based active case finding (ACF) was
implemented in Mbandaka, a regional capital with four confirmed EVD cases, following completion of contact
tracing. The goal of this HF-based ACF system was to look for undetected EVD cases among patients that visited
HFs beginning one week prior to the system’s implementation.
Methods: From 23 June – 24 July 2018, ACF teams visited HFs in Mbandaka and reviewed all medical records as far
back as 17 June for any consultations meeting the suspected EVD case definition. The teams then assessed whether
to validate these as suspected EVD cases based on factors such as recovery, epidemiological links, and their clinical
judgement. ACF teams also assessed HFs’ awareness of EVD symptoms and the process for alerting suspected
cases. We calculated descriptive statistics regarding the characteristics of reviewed consultations, alert cases, and
visited HFs. We also used univariate and multivariate random effects logistic regression models to evaluate the
impact of repeated ACF visits to the same HF on the staff’s awareness of EVD.
Results: ACF teams reviewed 37,746 consultations, of which 690 met the definition of a suspected case of EVD.
Two were validated as suspected EVD cases and transferred to the Ebola Treatment Unit for testing; both tested
negative. Repeated ACF visits to the same HF were significantly associated with improved EVD awareness
(p < 0.001) in univariate and multivariate analyses.
Conclusion: HF-based ACF during EVD outbreaks may improve EVD awareness and reveal many individuals
meeting the suspected case definition. However, many who meet this definition may not have EVD, depending on the
population size covered by ACF and amount of ongoing EVD transmission. Given the burdensome procedure of
testing suspected EVD cases, future HF-based ACF systems would benefit from improved clarity on which patients
require further testing.
Keywords: Active case finding, Ebola, Ebola virus disease, Health facility, Surveillance, Democratic Republic of the
Congo
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Background
Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) is notorious for its high mortal-
ity rate and propagation in healthcare facilities (HFs). Peri-
odic outbreaks of EVD have been recognized since 1976,
most notably the 2013–2016 West African epidemic, which
resulted in over 28,000 cases and 11,000 deaths [1, 2]. Mul-
tiple EVD outbreaks have occurred in the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo (DRC). This paper focuses on its ninth
epidemic, which occurred in Équateur Province in 2018; its
tenth and largest yet, centered in North Kivu and Ituri
Provinces, has caused over 2500 confirmed and probable
cases as of 14 July 2019, and on 17 July 2019 was declared a
Public Health Emergency of International Concern [3, 4].
The ninth outbreak of EVD in DRC was declared on 8
May 2018 in Équateur Province. Following the outbreak
declaration, the Ministry of Health (MoH) and partners
quickly mounted an epidemic response. The second
negative test of the final detected EVD patient occurred
on 12 June, and the official end of the epidemic was de-
clared 42 days (i.e. two incubation periods) later, on 24
July 2018. The epidemic had a total of 54 confirmed and
probable EVD cases (Fig. 1), of which 33 died (overall
Case-Fatality Rate: 61%) [5]. Of major concern was the
occurrence of four confirmed cases in Wangata Health
Zone in the city of Mbandaka, a regional transportation
hub bordering the Republic of the Congo with a popula-
tion of around one million people [5, 6].
EVD surveillance in the early phase of this outbreak,
as in previous EVD epidemics, relied primarily on detec-
tion and follow-up of all contacts of known EVD cases.
Although contact tracing can be very effective, it is im-
portant that all contacts be successfully identified and
followed up [7]. As in previous outbreaks, an early warn-
ing ‘alert’ system, with alerts reported from both formal
healthcare structures as well as the community, was also
implemented [8]. Active case finding (ACF) is another
key surveillance activity for control of EVD transmission,
which relies on active early identification of suspect
cases who may not otherwise be reported [9]. For ex-
ample, ACF teams may visit households or HFs to look
for possible EVD cases [10, 11]. Although ACF has been
used in almost all previous EVD outbreaks either at the
beginning, throughout, or at the tail end, published data
on its impact are limited.
HFs provide an appealing location for ACF based on
symptom screening. Due to the severity of symptoms, indi-
viduals with EVD are likely to come in contact with the
healthcare system during the course of their illness. How-
ever, these cases may not be detected if health care workers
(HCWs) lack awareness of EVD symptoms and the proced-
ure for reporting suspected cases [12]. In previous epi-
demics, the occurrence of a nosocomial outbreak involving
HCWs has sometimes been the event that triggered EVD
detection [13, 14]. In the 2013–2016 West African EVD
epidemic, nosocomial transmission to HCWs outside of
Ebola treatment units (ETUs) by patients with undetected
EVD continued after the establishment of these units [12,
15]. Infection in HFs has also contributed significantly to
transmission in the ongoing DRC epidemic [16].
However, symptom-based surveillance for EVD is
complicated by the low specificity of EVD symptoms.
Studies comparing symptoms among people diagnosed
with EVD and people tested negative for EVD have re-
vealed this challenge [17, 18]. Other diseases such as
malaria may be mistaken for EVD, and vice-versa [19,
20]. Furthermore, the positive predictive value of the
case definition in the absence of an epidemiological link
will vary based on the prevalence of EVD, which itself
Fig. 1 Epidemiological curve by week of illness onset, Équateur Province, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2018 [5]
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depends on the status of the epidemic and the size of
the population being surveilled; in Mbandaka, which had
very few confirmed cases and a large population size, we
believed this value to be extremely low. Evidence is
needed to show how well HF-based ACF for EVD works
given these diagnostic challenges.
In this paper, we outline the implementation of an
HF-based ACF system in Mbandaka during the 2018
Équateur EVD outbreak and discusses the strengths and
weaknesses of the system put in place.
Methods
ACF system
The HF-based ACF system in Mbandaka took place from
23 June – 24 July 2018, following the second negative test
of the final EVD patient and during the period of en-
hanced surveillance between the end of contact tracing
and the official end of the epidemic. The objectives were
1) early detection of all potential cases of EVD in HFs, and
2) reinforcement of the previously-established system of
alerts, consisting of a phone hotline that could be called
by HFs, points of entry, and other key sites upon suspicion
of an EVD case.
The HF-based ACF visits were conducted by MoH
teams of doctors and nurses. To guide their visits, lists
were created in advance of all known HFs in each of the
three health zones of the city of Mbandaka. Each HF
was assigned a priority based on the typical number of
consultations per week and the types of medical services
offered. The targeted frequency of visits was twice a
week for high-priority HFs, once a week for medium-
priority, and once every two weeks for low-priority, aim-
ing to maximize the utility of a limited number of ACF
teams. Thus, during the four-week period of enhanced
surveillance, each high-priority HF should have been vis-
ited at least eight times, each medium-priority HF at
least four times, and each low-priority HF at least twice.
ACF teams could also visit any HFs that were not on
this initial list that were recognized based on their know-
ledge of the area or discussions with others.
Upon the first ACF visit to an HF, the teams presented
themselves to the HF’s head to discuss their visit and to
request a designated focal point. At the start of this and all
subsequent visits to the HF, the ACF team began by ask-
ing about four EVD awareness indicators: 1) knowledge of
the definition of a suspected case of EVD (Table 1), 2)
knowledge of the system of alerts, 3) knowledge of the
phone number to call if a patient met the suspected case
definition, and 4) having already posted a flyer including
the phone number and definition of a suspected case in a
visible area. The ACF team would then supply the HF
focal point with any information missing from their re-
sponses. For the analyses presented here, HFs that
responded yes to all four indicators were considered to
have good EVD awareness.
The ACF team next examined the HF registry or con-
sultation sheets with the HF focal point to ensure they
had sufficient information to apply the definition of a sus-
pected case of EVD and identify the patients if necessary,
i.e. name, address, telephone number, symptoms, etc. The
ACF team then reviewed all recorded consultations start-
ing with the day of the current visit and moving back-
wards until either 17 June (one week before HF-based
ACF implementation, for the first visit to an HF) or the
day of the previous visit (for repeated HF-based ACF visits
to the same HF). Any consultation meeting the definition
of a suspected case of EVD (Table 1) was to be considered
an alert case. The ACF teams discussed these cases with
the HF staff to ask whether they had already been alerted;
if not, they were treated as new alert cases. The ACF
teams evaluated the new alert cases based on the informa-
tion available at the HF, supplemented by phone inter-
views with the patients or household visits allowing for
clinical observation by the ACF investigators. ACF investi-
gators assessed the patients’ clinical signs and symptoms,
the course of their illness, and the presence of EVD risk
factors to determine whether they should be validated as
EVD suspected cases and transferred to the ETU for test-
ing and treatment. Suspected cases were reported to the
alert center by telephone via EWARS (Early Warning
Alert and Response System). Those not retained as
Table 1 Definition of a suspected case of EVD used for HF-
based ACF during the 2018 Equateur EVD outbreak
Definition of a suspected case of EVD
1. Any unexplained death
2. Any unexplained bleeding
3. Any spontaneous abortion
4. Fever > 38 °C and contact with a probable or confirmed case of EVD
5. Fever > 38 °C and contact with a sick or dead animal
6. Fever > 38 °C and≥ 3 of the following
symptoms:
Vomiting
Diarrhea
Intense fatigue
Anorexia/lack of
appetite
Abdominal pain
Muscle or joint pain
Headache
Difficulty in
swallowing
Difficulty in breathing
Skin rash
Hiccups
A person meeting any of the numbers 1–6 would meet the suspected
case definition
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suspected cases were designated as “invalidated” alert
cases. There were no specific guidelines on which cases
should be validated or invalidated. Rather, these assign-
ments were subjectively made on an ad-hoc basis, with
only those that the ACF investigators judged highest risk
being validated. Clinical improvement was used as a rea-
son not to validate a case; however, the diagnoses assigned
by the HFs were not assumed to rule out the possibility of
EVD. Information including age, sex, symptoms, and diag-
nosis determined by the HF was recorded for all new alert
cases, both validated and invalidated. The specific reason a
case was validated or invalidated was typically not re-
corded. Finally, the ACF team provided feedback to the
HF focal point regarding the registry (such as whether it
was up to date and included sufficient details, and how
many cases met the suspected case definition).
Data management and analysis
Summaries of each HF-based ACF visit, such as the num-
ber of reviewed consultations, the number of alert cases,
and responses to the EVD knowledge indicators, were re-
corded on paper forms that were then entered into an
ACF database. Separately, details of new alert cases such
as age, sex, and symptoms were recorded on paper and
then entered into an alert database. The alert database also
included data from new alert cases arising outside of the
HF-based ACF system, and was updated daily based on
the received alerts. All data were collected for surveillance
and public health rather than research purposes. Prior to
the analyses in this paper, the alerts and ACF data sets
were evaluated for discrepancies and corrected using the
data from the paper forms when possible. The master list
of HFs was also improved by adding all HFs visited by
ACF teams that were not already listed; these HFs were
assumed to have low priority.
The ACF data set was used for all analyses related to
HFs visited and consultations reviewed, whereas the alerts
data set was used for all analyses describing the character-
istics of alert cases. Analyses consisted primarily of de-
scriptive statistics regarding the characteristics of reviewed
consultations, alert cases, and visited HFs. Logistic regres-
sions with a random effect for HF to account for repeated
visits were run to evaluate the effect of various HF and
visit characteristics on EVD awareness, with the main vari-
able of interest being the number of previous ACF visits
to the same HF. All statistical analyses were performed
using R, with regression models performed using function
glmer from package lme4 [21]. Details of the models used
are provided in Additional file 1.
Results
Description of consultations reviewed
From 23 June – 24 July 2018, HF-based ACF teams
made 407 visits to 113 HFs in Mbandaka. The teams
reviewed the records for 37,746 consultations occurring
from 17 June – 24 July 2018, of which 690 met the def-
inition of a suspected case of EVD, 358 were alert cases,
and 2 were validated as suspected EVD cases and trans-
ferred to the ETU for testing (Fig. 2); both tested nega-
tive. One consultation meeting the definition of a
suspected case of EVD was found for every 55 consulta-
tions reviewed. However, only one per 345 consultations
meeting this definition was validated by investigators as
a new suspected case.
For comparison, two of the 89 alert cases that were
alive at the time of the alert and arose from the alert sys-
tem excluding HF-based ACF from 23 June – 24 July
2018 were validated as suspected cases. Eighteen of these
89 alerts arose from points of entry (zero validated), one
from the community (zero validated), two from HFs out-
side of the HF-based ACF zones (one validated), and 68
from HFs within the HF-based ACF zones (one vali-
dated). ACF investigators classified 47 of the alert cases
that they detected as “already alerted”, suggesting they
did not record all such cases. As the ACF investigators
did not collect further information on these cases, we
did not attempt further to link these data sets.
Fig. 2 Flowchart of HF-based ACF activities. P1: Period 1, 23 June - 6
July; P2: Period 2, 7–24 July
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Due to an error in communication, during the initial
two weeks of HF-based ACF implementation, ACF
teams often did not alert cases meeting the suspected
case definition that they felt were clearly not EVD (fre-
quently because the case’s symptoms had already re-
solved by the time of the ACF visit, though the teams
may also have considered other criteria such as severity
of symptoms or lack of an epidemiological link). A brief-
ing held near the end of the second week emphasized
the importance of alerting all such consultations and
classifying them as “invalidated” rather than “not
alerted”. The proportion of consultations meeting the
definition of a suspected case that were alerted increased
accordingly: 5% in the first two weeks (Period 1, 23
June-6 July), compared to 96% in the latter 2.5 weeks
(Period 2, 7–24 July). More cases were recorded as
already alerted during Period 1 (42) than Period 2 (5).
This trend was similar but less extreme if counting
based on cases recorded in the alerts database rather
than ACF investigators’ reporting (41 in Period 1 vs 27
in Period 2).
Description of alerted cases
Table 2 describes 354 of the 358 total alert cases that
had detailed data available in the alert database. The
alert cases were young (median age = 12.5) and 42.3%
were male. Based on the information recorded in the
registers and format of the database, it was not possible
to know which symptoms were not present as opposed
to not recorded.
All alert cases should have met the definition for a sus-
pected EVD case. Using the symptoms available in the
database, we were able to reconstruct this for 72.0% of
alerted cases. It was not clear whether the remaining
cases did not in fact meet the definition or did not have
all symptoms recorded. Twelve (3.4%) alerted cases had
any bleeding, most frequently abnormal vaginal bleeding
(n = 4) or blood in the stool (n = 5), and 3 (0.8%) had
spontaneous abortion. Fever was the most frequently re-
ported symptom (94.9%). The other most common
symptoms, in descending order, were: headache (54.8%),
loss of appetite (54.0%), abdominal pain (53.4%), and
vomiting (50.6%). The two individuals from the HF-
based ACF system who were validated as suspected cases
until tested negative were both adult males with multiple
abnormal bleeding symptoms, and one was also recog-
nized as a previous contact of an EVD case past the
period of observation. Abnormal bleeding was also rec-
ognized in the two validated suspect cases identified by
alerts outside of the HF ACF system during the same
time period.
The alerted cases were attributed to malaria in 90.1%
of cases (Table 2). Malaria diagnoses were made clinic-
ally, as use of malaria rapid diagnostic tests was
discouraged given the risk of contamination and poten-
tial for malaria-EVD co-infection [22]. The second most
common diagnosis was gastrointestinal infection (often
in addition to malaria) at 35.3%. Respiratory infections,
gynecological problems, and unspecified illnesses
accounted for < 10% each. No unexplained deaths were
uncovered through the HF-based ACF system.
Description of visited HFs
The compiled master list of HFs included 140 HFs, of
which 104 were initially listed and prioritized, and 36
were added following an ACF visit. Twenty-seven of
these 140 HFs were never visited, 11 because they were
only accessible by the river, while others for unknown
reasons. The greatest number of visits per HF was 14, to
a medium-priority HF.
Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of all the HFs
from this master list. High-priority HFs were visited
most often, followed by medium, and finally low, but
some individual lower-priority HFs were visited more
often than some individual higher-priority HFs. There
were fewer public HFs than private HFs, but these were
more frequently high-priority (22/25 high-priority HFs
were public, compared with 33/140 HFs overall), and
were visited more often by ACF teams than private HFs.
The targets for number of visits per HF (8 for high-
priority, 4 for medium, and 2 for low) were met by 54
(39%) HFs: 6/25 (24%) high-priority HFs, 18/42 (43%)
medium-priority HFs, and 30/73 (41%) low-priority HFs.
Impact on HF EVD awareness
In assessing the impact of HF-based ACF visits on HF
EVD awareness, we excluded the first two days of HF-
based ACF (23–24 June), as 18/23 ACF visits during this
period were missing data on EVD awareness. However,
we continued to include these days when counting the
number of previous ACF visits to a given HF. The
remaining 30 days included 384 HF visits, of which 292
(76%) demonstrated good EVD awareness, 87 (23%) did
not demonstrate good EVD awareness, and 5 (1%) values
were missing. Good awareness was defined as positive
responses to all four EVD awareness indicators (see
Methods).
Table 4 shows the results of univariate and multivari-
ate logistic regression with an outcome of good EVD
awareness and a random effect for HF. All variables in
the table were included in the multivariate model. In
univariate and multivariate analysis, awareness of EVD
and the alerts system was positively associated with an
increasing number of previous ACF visits to the same
HF. EVD awareness was also positively associated with
the visit occurring later during the HF-based ACF period
(in weeks). The association with number of previous
visits remained consistent when considering different
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versions of the variable for week of visit, including di-
chotomizing to two weeks of HF-based ACF and putting
each week separately in the model.
Awareness of EVD was greater for HFs in Mbandaka
and non-significantly greater for HFs in Bolenge Health
Zone, compared to Wangata. Public HFs and high-
priority HFs were associated with greater awareness in
univariate but not multivariate analyses.
Discussion
In this paper we summarize the HF-based ACF system
set up in Mbandaka, DRC, in the final stages of the
Équateur EVD epidemic. The results illustrate both the
strengths and challenges of deploying such a system for
EVD surveillance and control.
Over the course of 32 days, ACF teams reviewed over
37,000 consultations that took place beginning one week
prior to implementation of this system. In total, ACF
teams identified 690 consultations meeting the definition
of a suspected EVD case, the vast majority of which were
not already alerted by the HF. Although previous EVD
epidemics have resulted in decreases in healthcare-
seeking behavior [23], the low number of confirmed
EVD cases in the city of Mbandaka made this less likely.
Furthermore, an MoH policy that made healthcare free
for the duration of the epidemic likely encouraged
people with symptoms to seek care, making this system
an effective means of finding individuals meeting the
suspected case definition.
A strength of this system was its positive impact on
HF awareness of EVD, including knowing the definition
of a suspected EVD case and the phone number of the
EVD alerts system. HF awareness of EVD improved sig-
nificantly according to the number of previous ACF
visits, an effect that could not be fully explained by gen-
eral time trends. ACF teams also identified HFs not on
the official master list, thus allowing more HFs to benefit
from this intervention. On the other hand, the frequency
of ACF visits to each HF was highly variable and fre-
quently did not meet pre-specified targets. Initiating
analyses of ACF visits early into its implementation, ra-
ther than after its completion, could help refine such tar-
gets to ensure they are reasonable and on track to being
achieved.
One clear challenge of HF-based ACF for EVD shown
by these results is the non-specificity of the EVD sus-
pected case definition in this setting. Mbandaka is a
large city with a high burden of infectious diseases, and
the HF-based ACF system was implemented at a late
stage of the epidemic. As seen by the low number of val-
idated alerts, ACF investigators used not only the clinical
case definition, but also epidemiological factors, clinical
evolution, and general clinical judgement to decide
whether an alert should be validated. The inclusion of
Table 2 Description of cases alerted by ACF
Variable Number (%) or
Median [IQR]
N = 354
Demographics
Age 12.5 years [6–25]
Sex: Male 146 (42.3%)g
Symptoms
Any Bleedinga 12 (3.4%)
Spontaneous Abortion 3 (0.8%)
Fever 336 (94.9%)
Headache 194 (54.8%)
Vomiting 179 (50.6%)
Loss of Appetite 191 (54.0%)
Diarrhea 58 (16.4%)
Intense Fatigue 151 (42.7%)
Abdominal Pain 189 (53.4%)
Muscle or Joint Pain 98 (27.7%)
Difficulty Swallowing 4 (1.1%)
Difficulty Breathing 9 (2.5%)
Hiccups 0
Rash 3 (0.8%)
Cough 60 (16.9%)
Weakness 44 (12.4%)
Nausea 62 (17.5%)
≥3 Defining Symptoms from Suspected EVD Case
Definitionb
255 (72.0%)
Documented Symptoms Meet Suspected EVD Case
Definitionc
255 (72.0%)
Diagnoses Recorded
Malaria 319 (90.1%)
Gastro-intestinal infectiond 125 (35.3%)
Respiratory infectione 23 (6.5%)
Gynecological problem or infectionf 9 (2.5%)
Unspecified 9 (2.5%)
aAny bleeding included: Blood in stool (5 individuals); abnormal vaginal
bleeding (4); vomiting blood (1); nosebleed + coughing up blood (1);
nosebleed + vomiting blood (1)
bIncludes all symptoms from “headache” to “rash”, i.e.: headache, vomiting,
lack of appetite, diarrhea, intense fatigue, abdominal pain, muscle or joint
pain, difficulty swallowing, difficulty breathing, hiccups, and rash
cIncludes any bleeding, any spontaneous abortion, or fever + ≥3
defining symptoms
dIncludes those described as gastroenteritis, intestinal parasite infection,
typhoid, dysentery, amebiasis, or salmonellosis
eIncludes those described as respiratory infections, pneumonia, bronchitis,
tuberculosis, or influenza-like illness
fIncludes gynecological infection, threatened abortion, spontaneous abortion,
and malaria infection during pregnancy
gNine (2.5%) individuals missing data on sex were removed from
the denominator
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these other factors in the assessments was necessary
given the low specificity of the EVD suspected case
definition, the heavy procedures involved in testing
each validated suspected case (transfer to ETU, etc),
and the low prior probability of EVD given the status
of the epidemic. However, this was largely done on
an ad-hoc basis, and the subjectivity of these deci-
sions could have increased the risk of an ACF investi-
gator mistakenly invalidating a true EVD case. Similar
ACF systems would be strengthened by clear guide-
lines on how to assess such patients, including spe-
cific accounting for clinical improvement, and/or
development of safe and effective rapid EVD diagnos-
tics that could be used directly by ACF teams [24,
25]. We also recommend that future ACF systems
collect data on the specific reason each alert was vali-
dated or invalidated to allow real-time assessments of
these decisions.
Another concerning finding was that the vast majority
of consultations that met the definition of a suspected
EVD case were not alerted by the HFs. In fact, this pro-
portion appeared to decrease over time despite improve-
ments in EVD knowledge. Perhaps this finding could be
explained by the number of non-EVD cases who met the
suspected EVD case definition. HFs may have been un-
willing to spend time and effort to alert cases meeting
this definition when they believed their symptoms could
be explained by other causes. A lack of trust in the case
definition could thus have weakened the alert system
and increased the need for HF-based ACF. It is also pos-
sible that the HF-based ACF system itself directly de-
creased the willingness of HFs to spontaneously alert
suspected EVD cases, either because the HF staff felt less
responsibility for alerting cases or because they realized
that the majority of alert cases uncovered by the ACF
teams were not validated as suspected cases and did not,
in fact, have EVD.
Ideally, future HF-based ACF systems would focus on
both improving HF EVD knowledge and encouraging
HFs to alert cases on their own. Earlier implementation
of HF-based ACF during future EVD epidemics could le-
verage the positive impacts of ACF on HF awareness to
train HCWs regarding proper utilization of the alerts
system. As the alert system becomes more effective, the
HF-based ACF system would then contribute less to the
discovery of suspected cases, though it could still be
used periodically to monitor the performance of the alert
system and reinforce HCW awareness. However, earlier
implementation would also create greater resource re-
quirements. In this outbreak, HF-based ACF was imple-
mented after the end of contact tracing by the same
teams of people who had previously been investigating
contacts. Given the low positive predictive value of HF-
based ACF seen here and the high effectiveness of
Table 3 Description of HFs targeted for ACF in Mbandaka
Variable Number of HFs Median Number
of Visits Per HF [IQR]
All HFs N/A 140 2 [1–5]
Type of HF Private 107 2 [0.5–3]
Public 33 6 [5–7]
HF Priority Low 73 1 [0–3]
Medium 42 3 [2–5]
High 25 6 [5–7]
Health Zone within
city of Mbandaka
Wangata 72 3 [1–4]
Mbandaka 45 2 [1–5]
Bolenge 23 3 [0–5]
River Accessibility
Only
No 129 3 [1–5]
Yes 11 0 for all
Table 4 Univariate and multivariate associations with “good awareness of EVD”
Variable HF
Visits
Visits with Good
EVD Awareness
Univariate Odds
Ratio
Univariate
P-Value
Multivariate
Odds Ratio
Multivariate
P-Value
Previous ACF Visits to HF No, First Visit 90 33 Ref Ref Ref Ref
Yes, 2nd or 3rd Visit 152 121 11.2 (5.1, 29.3) < 0.0001 4.4 (2.0, 10.8) 0.0005
Yes, 4th + Visit 142 138 141.5 (36.4, 830.9) < 0.0001 15.0 (3.5, 84.3) 0.0007
Week Continuous 384 292 4.4 (3.0, 7.2) < 0.0001 2.6 (1.8, 4.2) < 0.0001
Type of HF Private 196 130 Ref Ref Ref Ref
Public 188 162 3.6 (2.0, 7.1) < 0.0001 2.4 (0.7, 9.5) 0.19
HF Priority Low 112 74 Ref Ref Ref Ref
Medium 135 104 1.8 (0.9, 3.4) 0.07 1.0 (0.4, 2.6) 0.92
High 137 114 3.0 (1.5, 6.7) 0.002 0.6 (0.1, 2.5) 0.46
Health Zone Wangata 210 146 Ref Ref Ref Ref
Mbandaka 119 101 2.5 (1.4, 4.7) 0.002 4.1 (1.7, 10.9) 0.002
Bolenge 55 45 2.4 (1.1, 5.7) 0.03 3.1 (0.9, 11.2) 0.06
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contact tracing in stopping EVD epidemics, HF-based
ACF should only be considered earlier in the outbreak if
sufficient resources exist for both interventions; it is im-
portant that resources for contact tracing not be
diverted towards HF-based ACF. Future surveillance sys-
tems could also consider integrating additional assess-
ments into ACF visits to increase their utility, such as of
supplies of personal protective equipment and know-
ledge of infection prevention and control [26], and con-
necting HFs with the appropriate resources as necessary.
Approximately 90% of all alert cases found through
HF-based ACF were clinically attributed to malaria. Pre-
vious studies have shown high prevalence of malaria in
Bolenge Health Zone [27], and the young ages of alerted
cases (median 12.5 years) is also consistent with a high
burden of malaria. During the West African EVD epi-
demic, mass drug administration for malaria was imple-
mented in some areas of Sierra Leone to reduce the
difficulty in identifying EVD cases and led to significant
decreases in the number of alerts [28]. This approach
was not considered necessary during the Équateur out-
break, but could be considered in future EVD epidemics
in hyperendemic malaria areas. Indeed it has been im-
plemented in Beni during the most recent DRC epi-
demic [29]. The large burden of illness attributable to
malaria and other diseases also demonstrates the need
for public health investment and research outside of
emergency situations in poorly resourced settings such
as Mbandaka.
The limitations of this paper reflect the challenges of
EVD surveillance in Mbandaka. The data were collected
for public health purposes and, given competing re-
source priorities, not collected with the same degree of
quality assurance as for a research study. However, we
revisited the completed paper forms and compared the
available databases to check for and correct discrepan-
cies before the analyses presented here. The diagnoses
recorded for alert cases were made clinically and typic-
ally without confirmatory testing. Given the high burden
of malaria in this setting, it is likely that malaria tests
would have been positive even for illnesses with other
causes. Finally, some individuals meeting the suspected
case definition may have been missed due to incomplete
reporting in HF registries.
Conclusion
HF-based ACF may improve HF knowledge of EVD
symptoms and the procedure for reporting suspected
cases. It can also help detect individuals seeking care for
symptoms consistent with the EVD suspected case defin-
ition, particularly when the alert system is underper-
forming. Both of these finding support the roll-out of
similar ACF systems during future EVD epidemics, par-
ticularly towards the beginning of these epidemics.
However, the low positive predictive value of the defin-
ition of suspected EVD cases in areas with high burdens
of other infectious diseases and low circulation of EVD
implies in a heavy reliance on factors outside the clinical
case definition to determine which alerts should be vali-
dated and transferred to the ETU for EVD testing. Fu-
ture ACF systems should define clear guidelines about
which cases should be validated and tested, based on cri-
teria that may be context-specific, and focus on ensuring
all cases are alerted starting from the beginning of the
outbreak.
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